HRM Week 9 Discussion – Behind the Mask: The Politics of Employee Appraisal
Based on the selected article Behind the Mask: The Politics of Employee Appraisal, answer the following questions: (2 PARAGRAPHS PER QUESTION)
- What is the basic theme of the article? Try to state it in just one or two paragraphs.
- What did the article mention about “Politics as a reality of organizational life?” How do you feel about that?
- What did the article highlight about “inflating performance appraisals?”
- In the conclusion section of the article, what was a major finding of this study and what do you believe about the finding?
Remember, the syllabus says you need to do the following steps in order to get full credit:
- Read the article
- Each student must post a response to the discussion questions (2 paragraphs for each question)
Behind the Mask:
The Politics of Employee Appraisal
By Clinton 0. Longenecker Henry P. Sims, Jr.
The University of Toledo George Mason University and
The Pennsylvania State University
Dennis A. Gioia
The Pennsylvania State University
There is really no getting around the fact
that whenever I evaluate one of my peo-
ple, I stop and think about the impact-the
ramifications of my decisions on my relation-
ship with the guy and his future here. I’d be
stupid not to. Call it being politically
minded, or using managerial discretion, or
fine tuning the guy’s ratings, but in the end
I’ve got to live with him, and I’m not going to
rate a guy without thinking about the fall-
out. There are a lot of games played in the
rating process and whether we [managers]
admit it or not we are all guilty of playing
them at our discretion.
According to management books and manuals, em-
ployee appraisal is an objective, rational and, we hope,
accurate process. The idea that executives might delib-
erately distort and manipulate appraisals for political
purposes seems unspeakable. Yet we found extensive
evidence to indicate that, behind a mask of objectivity
and rationality, executives engage in such manipulation
in an intentional and systematic manner. In perform-
ance appraisal, it appears that some of the Machiavel-
lian spirit still lives.
Our original goal was to conduct a scholarly inves-
tigation of the cognitive processes executives typically
use in appraising subordinates. We held in-depth inter-
views with 60 upper-level executives who had extensive
experience in formally evaluating their subordinates on
a periodic basis. During these interviews, we heard
many frank admissions of deliberate manipulation of
formal appraisals for political purposes. In this article
we’ll discuss the “why and the how” of such politically
motivated manipulation.
On the Appraisal Process
Almost every executive has dreaded performance
appraisals at some time or other. They hate to give
them and they hate to receive them. Yet, like them or
not, every executive recognizes that appraisals are a
fact of organizational life. In terms of time, a formal
appraisal of a subordinate takes perhaps three or four
hours out of the working year; in terms of impact on
the lives of executives and their employees, appraisals
have significance that reaches far beyond the few hours
it takes to conduct them.
Because of the important role appraisals play in
individual careers and corporate performance, a great
deal of attention has been given to trying to under-
stand the process. Special attention has been directed
toward the issue of accuracy in appraisals.’ Academi-
cians in particular have expended (some might say
wasted) substantial energy trying to design the perfect
instrument that would yield an accurate appraisal.
That effort now appears to be a hopeless, even impossi-
ble, task.
More recently, a flurry of activity has centered on
the arcane mental processes of the manager who gives
the appraisal. It is an intruiging approach because it
involves a kind of vicarious attempt to climb inside an
executive’s head to see how he or she works. Predict-
ably, however, this approach has confirmed the elusive-
ness of deciphering managerial thought processes.
Moreover, it has not yet resulted in appraisals that are
any more accurate than existing appraisals.2
Even more recently, some effort has been directed
toward demonstrating that appraisal is, in addition to
everything else, a highly emotional process as well.
When emotional variability gets dragged into the pro-
cess, any hope of obtaining objectivity and accuracy in
appraisal waltzes right out the office door.3
Taken together, all these approaches apparently
lead to the depressing conclusion that accuracy in ap-
praisals might be an unattainable objective.4 More re-
alistically, perhaps accuracy is simply a wrong goal to
pursue. Even if we have a perfect understanding of in-
struments and mental and emotional processes, would
that result in accurate appraisals? Our research indi-
cates that it would not. All of these avenues to under-
standing appraisal tend to ignore an important point:
183
Academy of Management EXECUTIVE
Method
Our research approach involved in-depth, semis-
tructured interviews with 60 executives. The partici-
pants in the study came from seven large organizations
and represented 11 functional areas. As a group, they
averaged more than 20 years of work experience and
more than 13 years of managerial experience. Collec-
tively, they had performance appraisal experience in
197 organizations. Conclusions reported here, then, are
derived from a diversity of executives.
Each tape-recorded interview was designed to tap
the executive’s perception of his or her own perform-
ance appraisal processes. The interviews averaged more
than one and one-half hours in length. Although the
interview used some a priori “probes,” the interviewing
strategy mainly encouraged the subject to respond
freely and subjectively.
The data collection yielded more than 100 hours
of tape-recorded verbal data. All data from each inter-
view were transcribed onto five-by-eight cards that
mainly consisted of executives’ directly quoted state-
ments, with each card containing one statement,
thought, or observation by an executive on a given
topic. The transcription process yielded 1,400 cards,
which were then classified according to various political
issues that emerged during the interviews.
For a classification group to qualify as a potential
“finding,” a minimum of 72%() of the respondents had
to have brought up that issue. A research assistant
then read each group of cards and assigned a label that
captured the “essence” of the executives’ views on a
particular aspect of the appraisal process. The out-
comes from this process were the designated findings of
the study. To further enhance the reliability and valid-
ity of the research, two research assistants then inde-
pendently developed frequency counts for each finding.
They tallied the number of cards in each classification
group that supported the finding that had been identi-
fied in the second step of the analysis. The frequencies
tabulated by each judge ranged from a low of 43 re-
sponses (72%(,) to a high of 57 (95%). A correlation
analysis of the frequencies revealed an r = .94 as a
measure of inter-rater reliability in identifying the
findings.
Appraisals take place in an organizational environment
that is anything but completely rational, straightfor-
ward, or dispassionate. In this environment, accuracy
does not seem to matter to managers quite so much as
discretion, effectiveness or, more importantly, survival.
Earlier research has either missed or glossed over the
fact that executives giving appraisals have ulterior mo-
tives and purposes that supercede the mundane con-
cern with rating accuracy.
On Politics in Performance
Appraisal
Any realistic discussion of performance appraisal
must recognize that organizations are political entities
and that few, if any, important decisions are made
without key parties acting to protect their own inter-
ests.” As such, executives are political actors in an or-
ganization, and they often attempt to control their
destinies and gain influence through internal political
actions.
Thus, it is likely that political considerations in-
fluence executives when they appraise subordinates.6
Politics in this sense refers to deliberate attempts by
individuals to enhance or protect their self-interests
when conflicting courses of action are possible. Political
action therefore represents a source of bias or inaccu-
racy in employee appraisal. To understand the ap-
praisal process thoroughly, thus, we must recognize
and account for the political aspects of the process.
Politics in Appraisal: Findings
from the Study
The political perspective emerged as a surpris-
ingly important and pervasive issue affecting the way
executives appraise their employees. Conclusions de-
rived from our interviews are summarized in Exhibits 1
through 4. Because a strong attempt was made to allow
executives to speak for themselves in describing the
politics of performance appraisals, direct quotations
from the interviews have been included in our analysis,
where appropriate. Our findings are discussed below.
Politics as a Reality of Organizational
Life
The most fundamental survey finding was an
open recognition and admission that politics were a re-
ality in the appraisal process. In fact, executives admit-
ted that political considerations nearly always were
part of their evaluation process. One vice-president
summarized the view these executives shared regarding
the politics of appraisal:
184
August, 1987
As a manager, I will use the review process to
do what is best for my people and the divi-
sion. . . . I’ve got a lot of leeway-call it dis-
cretion-to use this process in that manner.
. . . I’ve used it to get my people better
raises in lean years, to kick a guy in the
pants if he really needed it, to pick up a guy
when he was down or even to tell him that he
was no longer welcome here. It is a tool that
the manager should use to help him do what
it takes to get the job done. I believe most of
us here at – operate this way regard-
ing appraisals.. . . Accurately describing an
employee’s performance is really not as im-
portant as generating ratings that keep
things cooking.
Executives suggested several reasons why politics
were so pervasive and why accuracy was not their pri-
mary concern. First, executives realized that they must
live with subordinates in a day-to-day relationship.
Second, they were also very cognizant of the perma-
nence of the written document:
The mere fact that you have to write out
your assessment and create a permanent rec-
ord will cause people not to be -as honest or
as accurate as they should be. . . . We soften
the language because our ratings go in the
guy’s file downstairs [the Personnel Depart-
ment] and it will follow him around his
whole career.
Perhaps the most widespread reason why execu-
tives considered political action in the appraisal pro-
cess was that the the formal appraisal was linked to
compensation, career, and advancement in the organi-
zation. The issue of money was continually cited as a
major cause of intentional distortions in ratings.
I know that it sounds funny, but the fact
that the process is ultimately tied to money
influences the ratings a person receives. . .
Whenever a decision involves money things
can get very emotional and ticklish.
Although the logic of tying pay to the outcome of
performance ratings is sound, pay linkages increase the
likelihood that ratings will be manipulated. Both man-
agers and the organization as a whole are guilty of us-
ing the rating process as an opportunity to reach salary
objectives regarding employee compensation that have
little, if any, relationship to pay for performance. A di-
rector of research and development very candidly de-
scribed the predicament from the rater’s perspective:
Since the pay raise my people get is tied to
the ratings I give them, there is a strong in-
centive to inflate ratings at times to maxi-
mize their pay increases to help keep them
happy and motivated, especially in lean
years when the merit ceiling is low. . . . Con-
versely, you can also send a very strong mes-
sage to a nonperformer that low ratings will
hit him in the wallet. . . . There is no doubt
that a lot of us manipulate ratings at times
to deal with the money issue.
At times, an organization uses the appraisal pro-
cess as an instrument to control merit increase expend-
itures. The manipulative process can be summarized as
follows:
This thing [the appraisal process] can really
turn into an interesting game when the HR
[Human Resources] people come out with a
blanket statement like, “Money for raises is
tight this year and since superior performers
get 7% to 10% raises there will be no supe-
rior performers this year.” Talk about mak-
ing things rough for us [raters]!. . . They try
and force you to make the ratings fit the
merit allowances instead of vice versa.
Exhibit 1
Politics as a Reality of Organizational Life
* Political considerations were nearly always part
of executive evaluative processes.
* Politics played a role in the evaluation process
because:
-executives took into consideration the daily
interpersonal dynamics between them and
their subordinates;
-the formal appraisal process results in a per-
manent written document;
-the formal appraisal can have considerable
impact on the subordinate’s career and
advancement.
185
Academy of Management EXECUTIVE
Influences on Political Culture
Executives made it clear that if an organization
was political, the appraisal process would reflect these
politics:
Some organizations are more aggressive and
political than others, so it just makes sense
that those things carry over into the rating
process as well. . . . The organization’s cli-
mate will determine, to a great extent, how
successful any rating system will be, and it
follows that if any organization is very politi-
cal, the rating system will be political.
Several factors were identified by the executives
as having a strong influence on the political culture in
which the performance appraisal process operates. Per-
haps the strongest was the extent to which the formal
appraisal process was “taken seriously” by the organi-
zation. A plant manager in this study describes what it
means for an organization to “take the process
seriously”:
At some places the PA [performance ap-
praisal] process is a joke-just a bureaucrac-
tic things that the manager does to keep the
IR [industrial relations] people off his back.
At the last couple of places I’ve worked, the
formal review process is taken really seri-
ously; they train you how to conduct a good
interview, how to handle problems, how to
coach and counsel. . . . You see the things
[appraisals] reviewed by your boss, and he’s
serious about reviewing your performance in
a thorough manner. . . . I guess the biggest
thing is that people are led to believe that it
is a management tool that works; it’s got to
start at the top!
This quote suggests another important factor that
turns the appraisal process into a political process: the
extent to which higher level executives in the same
company use political factors in rating subordinates. A
“modeling” effect seems to take place, with managers
telling themselves, “If it’s okay for the guys upstairs to
do it, then we can do it, too.”
According to one executive we interviewed,
I’ve learned how not to conduct the review
from the bosses . . . but you do learn from
your boss how much slack or what you can
get away with in rating your people. . . . It
seems that if the manager’s boss takes it [the
appraisal] seriously, the subordinate [man-
ager] is more likely to follow. If the boss
plays games with the review, it seems like
the subordinate [manager] is more likely to
do so.
The economic health and growth potential of the
organization appeared as important factors influencing
the organization’s culture and, consequently, the ap-
praisal event. Similarly, the executive’s own personal
belief system-his or her perception of the value of the
appraisal process-also seemed to have an impact.
Generally, executives who honestly believed the pro-
cess contributed to the motivation of their subordi-
nates were less likely to allow political factors to affect
the appraisal. Conversely, executives who saw the ap-
praisal as a useless bureaucratic exercise were more
likely to manipulate the appraisal.
Moreover, if executives believed the appraisals
would be seriously scrutinized, reviewed, and evaluated
by their superiors, then the influence of political fac-
tors was likely to be reduced.
If somebody is carefully reviewing the marks
you give your people, then the game playing
is reduced. . . [but] as you rise in the organi-
zation, your boss has less direct knowledge of
your people and is less likely to question
your judgment, so the door is open for more
discretion.
The degree of open communication and trust be-
tween executives and subordinates seemed to have
some influence on the impact of political factors. The
more open the communication, the less likely that
politics would play a role:
If the manager and employee have a trusting
and open relationship and shoot straight
with each other, then the manager is less
likely to play games with ratings.
186
August, 1987
Last, but not least, the appraiser’s level in the or-
ganization’s hierarchy also seemed to have an influ-
ence. Executives generally believed the appraisal pro-
cess became more political and subjective as one
moved up the organizational ladder:
The higher you rise in this organization the
more weird things get with regard to how
they evaluate you. . . . The process becomes
more political and less objective and it seems
like the rating process focuses on who you
are as opposed to what you’ve actually ac-
complished. . . . As the stakes get higher,
things get more and more political.
Exhibit 2
Factors Influencing the Political Culture
of the Organization
* The economic health and growth potential of
the organization
* The extent to which top management supported
and, more importantly, did or did not practice
political tactics when appraising their own
subordinates
* The extent to which executives sincerely be-
lieved that appraisal was a necessary and worth-
while management practice or just a bureau-
cratic exercise
* The extent to which executives believed that
their written assessment of their subordinates
would be evaluated and scrutinized by their
superiors
? The extent to which an organization was willing
to train and coach its managers to use and
maintain the performance appraisal system
* The degree to which the appraisal process was
openly discussed among both executives and
subordinates
* The extent to which executives believed the ap-
praisal process became more political at higher
levels of the organizational hierarchy
Inflating the Appraisal
Although academicians have been preoccupied
with the goal of accuracy in appraisal, executives re-
ported that accuracy was not their primary concern.
Rather, they were much more interested in whether
their ratings would be effective in maintaining or in-
creasing the subordinate’s future level of performance.
In fact, many reported they would deliberately mis-
state the reported performance level if they felt per-
formance could be improved as a result:
When I rate my people it doesn’t take place
in a vacuum . . . so you have to ask yourself
what the purpose of the process is. . . . I use
this thing to my advantage and I know my
people and what it takes to keep them going
and that is what this is all about.
Overall, executives reported that deliberate dis-
tortions of the appraisal tended to be biased in the
subordinate’s favor:
Let’s just say that there are a lot of factors
that tug at you and play on your mind that
cause you to tend to soften the ratings you
give. It may not have a great impact all the
time but when you know a “5” will piss a
man off and “6” will make him happy.
You tell me which one you’d choose.
Plus, you don’t want to be the bad guy, the
bearer of gloom. It seems like ratings are al-
most always a little inflated at a minimum
because of people aspects in the evaluation
process.
Typically, executives tended to inflate the overall
rating rather than the individual appraisal items. In-
terestingly, although the overall rating was generally
the last item on the appraisal form, this overall rating
was determined first; then the executive went back and
completed the individual items.
Most of us try to be fairly accurate in assess-
ing the individual’s performance in different
categories. . . . If you are going to pump up
a person’s ratings, for whatever reason, it’s
done on the subordinate’s overall evaluation
category. That’s all they really care about,
anyway. . . . The problem is these things
have to match up, so if you know what the
guy’s overall rating is in the first place it will
probably color the rest of the appraisal.
Of course, this backward procedure is usually con-
trary to the recommended procedure and is also incon-
sistent with the typical assumptions about how deci-
sions are supposed to be made “objectively.”
Executives articulated several reasons as justification
for consciously inflating subordinate ratings. The most
frequently given reason was to maximize the merit in-
creases that a subordinate would be eligible to receive.
This reason was more likely to be given by executives
in organizations that closely linked the numerical score
187
Academy of Management EXECUTIVE
on the formal appraisal and the subsequent merit raise.
Sometimes executives wanted to protect or en-
courage a subordinate whose performance was tempo-
rarily suffering because of personal problems. In a sim-
ilar vein, executives would sometimes inflate a rating
simply because they felt sorry for a subordinate. They
wanted to avoid short-term “punishment” in the hope
that the subordinate would recover and perform once
again at an acceptable level.
It may sound kind of funny to say this, but
sometimes there is a tendency to give subor-
dinates ratings a little higher than they de-
serve because you feel sorry for them. . . . I
just had a guy go through a divorce and I’m
not going to kick him when he’s down, even if
his performance drops off. . . . If anything,
you might use the review to help pick him up
and get him back on his feet.
If the appraisal was reviewed by people outside
the department, executives sometimes inflated ratings
to avoid “hanging dirty laundry out in public.” Clearly,
many executives preferred to keep knowledge of
problems contained within the department.
There are two reviews at times, the written
one and the spoken one. The spoken review
is the real one, especially if there are things
of a sensitive nature. . . . I generally don’t
put those things down on paper in the review
for the whole world to read because it is gen-
erally none of their damn business. . . . I
could make all of us look bad or worse than
we really are.
Executives also admitted to inflating a rating to
avoid a confrontation with a subordinate with whom
the executive had recently had difficulties. They took
this action mainly to avert an unpleasant incident or
sometimes to avoid a confrontation that they believed
would not lead to an effective outcome.
On occasion, an executive might inflate the rating
because the subordinate’s performance had improved
during the latter part of the performance period, even
though the overall performance did not merit such a
rating. Again, the motivation for this higher-than-de-
served rating was a desire to encourage the subordinate
toward better performance in the next period:
Many of us have trouble rating for the entire
year. If one of my people has a stellar three
months prior to the review. . . . you don’t
want to do anything that impedes that per-
son’s momentum and progress.
Executives also recognized effort, even though the
effort might not pay off in actual performance:
If a man broke his back trying to do the best
job humanly possible, his ratings will gener-
ally reflect this if his boss understands peo-
ple. Take two people with the same perform-
ance, but one tried much harder-their
ratings will show it in my department. Low
ratings might trample that person’s desire to
put forth effort in the future.
Last, although not frequently reported, a few ex-
ecutives admitted to giving a higher rating to a prob-
lem employee to get the employee promoted “up and
out” of the department. Although executives only occa-
sionally admitted to this, the “up and out” rating pro-
cess was almost universally discussed as something
other managers actually do. One plant manager can-
didly remarked:
I’ve seen it happen, especially when you get
a young guy in here who thinks he’s only go-
ing to be here a short while before he gets
promoted. People like that become a real
pain in the ass. . . . If you want to get rid of
them quick, a year and a half of good ratings
should do it. . . . A lot of people inflate rat-
ings of people they can’t stand, or who think
they are God’s gift to the department, just to
get rid of them. Amen.
Of course, this practice helps an executive avoid
dealing with performance problems and passes the
problem along to someone else. Mainly, this tactic was
employed when an executive felt unable or unwilling to
deal with a performance problem or, especially, when
the source of the problem seemed to be based on “per-
sonality” or “style” conflicts.
188
August, 1987
Exhibit 3
Inflating the Appraisal
a Executives inflated the appraisal to provide rat-
ings that would effectively maintain or increase
the subordinate’s level of performance (the pri-
mary concern was not the accuracy of the
ratings).
* Inflated ratings occur primarily on the overall
performance rating, as opposed to the individual
appraisal items
* Executive justification for inflating the appraisal:
-to maximize the merit increases a subordinate
would be eligible to receive, especially when
the merit ceiling was considered low;
to protect or encourage a subordinate whose
performance was suffering because of personal
problems (feeling sorry for a subordinate also
resulted in an inflated appraisal);
-to avoid hanging dirty laundry out in public if
the performance appraisal would be reviewed
by people outside the organization;
-to avoid creating a written record of poor per-
formance that would become a permanent
part of a subordinate’s personnel file;
-to avoid a confrontation with a subordinate
with whom the manager had recently had
difficulties;
-to give a break to a subordinate who had im-
proved during the latter part of the perform-
ance period;
-to promote a subordinate “up and out” when
the subordinate was performing poorly or did
not fit in the department.
Deflating the Appraisal
For the most part, executives indicated that they
were very hesitant to deflate a subordinate’s rating be-
cause such a tactic would lead to subsequent problems:
I won’t say I’ve never given a subordinate
lower ratings then he or she deserves because
there’s time and place for that type of thing,
but let’s just say I hesitate to do that sort of
of thing unless I’m very sure of what the out-
come will be and that it won’t backfire.
Nevertheless, negative distortions did occur. Ex-
ecutives gave several reasons for using this tactic. First,
an overly negative rating was sometimes used to jolt a
subordinate to rise to his or her expected performance
level:
I’ve used the appraisal to shock an employee.
… If you’ve tried to coach a guy to get him
back on track and it doesn’t work, a low rat-
ing will more often than not slap him in the
face and tell him you mean business. . . . I’ve
dropped a few ratings way down to accom-
plish this because the alternative outcome
could be termination down the road, which
isn’t pretty.
Also, a deliberately deflated rating was sometimes used
to teach a rebellious subordinate a lesson:
Occasionally an employee comes along who
needs to be reminded who the boss is, and
the appraisal is a real tangible and appropri-
ate place for such a reminder ..
Deflated ratings were also used as part of a termination
procedure. First, a strongly negative rating could be
used to send an indirect message to a subordinate that
he or she should consider quitting:
If a person has had a questionable period of
performance, a strong written appraisal can
really send the message that they aren’t wel-
come any longer and should think about
leaving…. The written review sends a clear
message if the person has any doubt.
Second, once the decision has been made that the situ-
ation was unsalvageable, negative ratings could then be
used to build a strongly documented case against the
marginal or poor performer:
You’ll find that once a manager has made up
his or her mind that an employee isn’t going
to make it, the review [the written docu-
ment] will take on an overly negative tone.
. . . Managers are attempting to protect
themselves. . . . The appraisal process be-
comes downwardly biased because they [the
managers] fear that discussing and docu-
menting any positives of the employee’s per-
formance might be used against them at a
later point in time.
Of course, this tactic has recently become more
common because of lawsuits challenging the traditional
“employment at will” concept. The courts have clearly
189
Academy of Management EXECUTIVE
stated that terminations must not be frivolous; they
must be justified by economic constraints or documen-
tation of poor performance. In these cases managers
will use the process to protect themselves from litiga-
tion associated with an unlawful termination lawsuit.7
Exhibit 4
Deflating the Appraisal
* Executives indicated that they were very hesi-
tant consciously to deflate a subordinate’s rat-
ings because of potential problems associated
with such a tactic.
* Nevertheless, they sometimes deflated
appraisals:
-to shock a subordinate back on to a higher
performance track;
-to teach a rebellious subordinate a lesson
about who is in charge;
-to send a message to a subordinate that he or
she should consider leaving the organization;
-to build a strongly documented record of poor
performance that could speed up the termina-
tion process.
Summary
Our research clearly showed that executives be-
lieved there was usually a justifiable reason for gener-
ating appraisal ratings that were less than accurate.
Overall, they felt it was within their managerial discre-
tion to do so. Thus our findings strongly suggest that
the formal appraisal process is indeed a political pro-
cess, and that few ratings are determined without some
political consideration. Although research on rater “er-
ror” has traditionally suggested that raters can and do
inflate ratings (leniency errors) and deflate ratings
(stringency errors), researchers have typically not ac-
counted for the realities of the appraisal context to ex-
plain why these errors occur.
In the minds of the managers we interviewed,
these thoughts and behaviors are not errors but, rather,
discretionary actions that help them manage people
more effectively. Executives considered many factors
beyond the subordinate’s actual performance in their
ratings. Thus, organizational politics was a major factor
in the intentional manipulation of subordinate ratings.
Our findings provide support for the following po-
litical realities of organizational life: (1) executives in
large organizations are political actors who attempt to
avoid unnecessary conflict; (2) they attempt to use the
organization’s bureaucractic processes to their own ad-
vantage; and (3) they try to minimize the extent to
which administrative responsibilities create barriers
between them and their subordinates.
We also conclude that the organizational culture
in which the appraisal event occurs significantly influ-
enced the extent to which political activity would both
develop and operate. Of course, organizationwide pat-
terns are also strongly influenced by the support and
practice of top management. Indeed, we know that
lower-level managers tend to emulate high-status exec-
utives, and the way they use the appraisal process is no
exception. Thus, if top managers prepare ratings
poorly or deliberately distort them, this behavior will
tend to cascade down the organization.
Given these findings, what informative observa-
tions or constructive recommendations might we make
to minimize, or at least manage, the detrimental effects
of politics in employee appraisal? In fact, we have sev-
eral for both the individual manager and the organiza-
tion as a whole.
The Individual Manager
1. Quite frankly, our data suggest there are times
in organizational life when political necessity
supercedes the usually desirable goals of accuracy and
honesty in appraisal. The executives interviewed sug-
gested several compelling reasons for exercising mana-
gerial discretion contrary to traditional appraisal re-
search recommendations. Clearly, there are times when
individual employees and the organization as a whole
can benefit as a consequence. The caveat, of course, is
that the occasions when politics and discretion necessa-
rily intrude on the appraisal process should be chosen
judiciously. The overall effect on the organization
should be given due consideration.
2. Performance appraisal is perhaps most usefully
viewed as a high-potential vehicle for motivating and
rewarding employees, rather than as a mandatory, bu-
reaucratic exercise used only for judgmental or manip-
ulative purposes. Ideally, it should be treated as an op-
portunity to communicate formally with employees
about their performance, their strengths and weak-
nesses, and their developmental possibilities.
3. Executives should bear in mind that appraisal-
related actions, like many other organizational activi-
ties, serve as guides for subordinates. Employees who
must conduct appraisals often learn appraisal attitudes
and behaviors from their bosses. Thus if appraisals are
to be effective, high-ranking executives must treat the
process as significant so that political manipulation is
discouraged.
4. In addition, openness and trust between man-
agers and subordinates seems to be associated with a
lower level of detrimental political activity. Cultivating
understanding seems to reduce the perceived need for
resorting to interpersonal politics.
5. Finally, inflating or deflating appraisal ratings
for political ends might serve temporarily to help exec-
utives avoid a problem with certain employees or to ac-
complish some specific purpose. However, such inten-
190
August, 1987
tional manipulation may eventually come back to
haunt the perpetrating executive and, ultimately, the
organization as a whole. This is especially likely if the
company comes to accept political manipulation of ap-
praisals as part of the norm.
The Organization as a Whole
1. The appraisal process should operate in a sup-
portive organizational culture. Effective appraisal sys-
tems are characterized by the support of top managers
(who conduct appraisals themselves), training, open
discussions of the appraisal process on an annual basis
(perhaps a quality circle approach to appraisals), and
rewarding the efforts of managers who do top-notch
appraisals.
2. Systematic, regular, and formal appraisals
should start at the top of the organization. We found
that top executives want formal appraisals and rarely
get them. If appraisals are not done at the top, the
message sent to the rest of the organization is, “They
aren’t very important and thus shouldn’t be taken seri-
ously.” As a result, the door to more political activity is
opened wider.
3. Further, although training on how to do effec-
tive appraisals is important, managers also need to be
trained on why they need to be done. Understanding
the rationale for appraisals is important in building the
perception that the appraisal process is an effective
managerial tool and not merely a required bureaucrac-
tic procedure.
4. Open discussion of the political aspects of the
appraisal process (and their legal ramifications) should
be included in appraisal training programs. Although
managers made it clear that political manipulation of
ratings is commonplace, political issues were never
openly discussed in either training programs or in man-
agement development efforts.
5. When money is tied to the rating process, polit-
ically oriented ratings tend to increase. This creates a
dilemma: A “pay for performance” management phi-
losophy depends on the “objective” measurement of
performance. Yet the realities of politics in the mea-
surement process often mean that measurement will
not be objective. Should we therefore divorce appraisal
ratings from salary decisions? We think not. Pay for
performance is still a good concept in our view, even in
light of our findings. Attention to the recommendations
we present in this section should minimize the impact
of manipulative politics in appraisal ratings.
6. In addition, the number of people who have ac-
cess to the written appraisal should be minimized. The
more people who have access to the appraisal, the
greater the temptation for the rater to “impression
manage” it. Remember, the fact that the appraisal is
written down often means that it is less than com-
pletely accurate, simply because it is publicly available.
7. The findings of this study have legal implica-
tions as well. Organizations are more susceptible to liti-
gation involving charges of unlawful discharge or dis-
crimination than ever before. Accurate, valid appraisals
can help an organization defend itself; inaccurate, inva-
lid appraisals can put the organization at risk. Of
course, the relatively recent practice of extensive docu-
mentation of poor performance has been in part a re-
sponse to the modern legal climate. Paradoxically, that
climate has arguably increased the role of politics in
formal appraisal, as organizations try to maintain legal
grounds for termination decisions. Still, the often polit-
ically motivated practice of building a case for dismis-
sal via documentation of poor performance has come
under closer scrutiny as trends in employee appraisal
are given closer examination. The best advice here is to
stress honesty in appraisal as a “default option” policy.
Credible and consistent appraisal practices are the best
defense against ligitation. Thus some counseling in the
legal ramifications of appraisal should become part of
executive training.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most interesting finding from our
study (because it debunks a popular mythology) is that
accuracy is not the primary concern of the practicing
executive in appraising subordinates. The main con-
cern is how best to use the appraisal process to moti-
vate and reward subordinates. Hence, managerial dis-
cretion and effectiveness, not accuracy, are the real
watchwords. Managers made it clear that they would
not allow excessively accurate ratings to cause
problems for themselves, and that they attempted to
use the appraisal process to their own advantage.
The astute manager recognizes that politics in
employee appraisal will never be entirely squelched.
More candidly, most of us also recognize that there is
some place for politics in the appraisal process to facili-
tate necessary executive discretion. The goal, then, is
not to arbitrarily and ruthlessly try to eliminate polit-
ics but, instead, to effectively manage the role politics
plays in employee appraisal. U
191
Academy of Management EXECUTIVE
Clinton 0. Longenecker is an assistant pro-
fessor of management in the College of Business
Administration at the University of Toledo. He
received his B.B.A. in industrial marketing and
M.B.A. in management from the University of
Toledo, and holds a Ph.D. in organizational be-
havior from The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity. Dr. Longenecker has extensive work expe-
rience in the construction industry and is
currently an active trainer and management
consultant to a variety of different organiza-
tions and several government agencies special-
izing in team building, organization develop-
ment, and performance management systems.
He is a staff consultant with the Management
Center at the University of Toledo, and has
also worked in Haiti, managing several mission-
ary building projects including school and hos-
pital construction. Dr. Longenecker’s current
research and writing interests focus on manage-
ment effectiveness, increasing human perform-
ance in the workplace, organization develop-
ment, and understanding politics and cognitive
processes in the context of the real world. He
has received three outstanding teacher awards
from two universities.
Dennis A. Gioia is associate professor of
organizational behavior at the College of Busi-
ness Administration at the Pennsylvania State
University. He received his B.S. in engineering
science and his M.B.A. and his Ph.D. in man-
agement from Florida State University. Prior to
his academic career, he worked as an engineer-
ing aide for Boeing Aerospace at the John F.
Kennedy Space Center and as a vehicle recall
coordinator for Ford Motor Company in Dear-
born, Michigan.
Dr. Gioia’s research and writing have fo-
cused primarily on the nature and uses of com-
plex cognitive processes by organizational mem-
bers and the ways in which these processes
facilitate sense making, communication, and in-
fluence. His most recent interests have to do
with the less rational, more intuitive, emo-
tional, and political aspects of organizational
life (as represented by this article). Recent
works of Dr. Gioia have appeared in the Acad-
emy of Management Review, Business Horizons,
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, and Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, among others. He is also co-editor,
with Dr. Henry P. Sims, Jr., of The Thinking
Organization, a book of original contribution
concerning the dynamics of cognitive processes
in organizations, published in 1986 by Jossey-
Bass.
Henry P. Sims, Jr., is currently profes-
sor of management at George Mason Univer-
sity, on leave from The Pennsylvania State
University. Dr. Sims’s special area of research
is managerial leadership. He has published over
75 articles on this subject, including articles in
the Academy of Management Journal and the
Academy of Management Review. His book, The
Thinking Organization, edited with Dr. Dennis
A. Gioia, was published by Jossey-Bass in 1986.
Another book, The Superleader: Discovering
How to Lead Others to Lead Themselves,
coauthored with Charles Manz, will be pub-
lished by Prentice-Hall in 1988. Dr. Sims has
consulted with many U.S. and multinational
firms, including Ford Motor Company and the
U.S. Agency for International Development.
192
August, 1987
ENDNOTES
1. For an extensive discussion of this point, see F.J.
Landy and J.L. Farr’s “Performance Rating,” Psychological
Bulletin, 1980, 87, 72-107. This issue is further developed in
Landy and Farr’s book, The Measurement of Work Perform-
ance, New York: Academic Press, 1983. It is clear that the
psychometric aspects of the appraisal process are only one
part of understanding and improving appraisals.
2. DeNisi, Cafferty, and Meglino have recently dis-
cussed the key issues and complications associated with un-
derstanding the psychology of managerial decision making in
the appraisal process in their recent article, “A Cognitive
View of the Performance Appraisal Process: A Model and
Research Prospective,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 1984, 33, 360-396. For a discussion of further
cognitive complications in the appraisal process as a result of
unconscious information processing, refer to D. A. Gioia and
P.P. Poole, “Scripts in Organizational Behavior,” Academy of
Management Review, 1984, 9, 449-459.
3. For an exploration of some of the emotional and af-
fective factors that might bear on appraisal processes, see 0.
S. Park, H. Sims, Jr., and S. J. Motowidlo’s “Affect in Orga-
nizations: How Feelings and Emotions Influence Managerial
Judgment,” in H. P. Sims and D. A. Gioia and Associates
(Eds.) The Thinking Organization.
4. Jack Feldman suggests in his article, “Beyond Attri-
bution Theory: Cognitive Processes in Performance Evalua-
tion,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 1981, 66, 127-148, that
raters have certain cognitive flaws in information processing
that make complete objectivity and validity in rating unob-
tainable. Also see W. C. Borman’s “Explaining the Upper
Limits of Reliabiity and Validity in Performance Ratings,”
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1978, 63, 135-144.
5. Jeffrey Pfeffer, in his book Power in Organizations,
Marshfield, MA: Pittman Publishing Co., 1981, makes a
strong case that political gamesmanship and the use of power
in organizations surround almost every important decision in
organizational life. The implications of the appraisal process
(e.g., pay raises, promotions, terminations) make the ap-
praisal of performance an important decision-making
enterprise.
6. Bernardin and Beatty, in their book Performance
Appraisal: Assessing Human Behavior at Work, Boston,
MA: Kent, 1984, suggest that extraneous variables that are
not performance related have an effect on the rater’s decision
processes and that this influence is in fact a primary source
of bias and inaccuracy in performance ratings.
7. For an in-depth treatment of the legal issues con-
cerning performance appraisal, see P. S. Greenlaw and J.P
Kohl’s Personnel Management, New York: Harper & Row,
1986, 171-173. See also W. F. Cascio and H. J. Bernardin’s
“Implications of Performance Litigation for Personnel Deci-
sions,” Personnel Psychology, Summer 1981, 217.